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Abstract  
The approaches and opinions of economists often dominate public policy discussion. 
Economists have gained this privileged position partly (or perhaps mainly) because of 
the obvious relevance of their subject matter, but also because of the unified 
methodology (neo-classical economics) that the vast majority of modern economists 
bring to their analysis of policy problems and proposed solutions. The idea of Pareto 
efficiency and its potential trade-off with equity is a central idea that is understood by 
all economists and this common language provides the economics profession with a 
powerful voice in public affairs. The purpose of this paper is to review and reflect 
upon the way in which economists find themselves analysing and providing 
suggestions for social improvements and how this role has changed over roughly the 
last 60 years. 
We focus on the fundamental split in the public economics tradition between those 
that adhere to public finance and those that adhere to public choice. A pure public 
finance perspective views failures in society as failures of the market. The solutions 
are technical, as might be enacted by a benevolent dictator. The pure public choice 
view accepts (sometimes grudgingly) that markets may fail, but so, it insists, does 
politics. This signals institutional reforms to constrain the potential for political 
failure. Certain policy recommendations may be viewed as compatible with both 
traditions, but other policy proposals will be the opposite of that proposed within the 
other tradition. 
In recent years a political economics synthesis emerged. This accepts that institutions 
are very important and governments require constraints, but that some degree of 
benevolence on the part of policy makers should not be assumed non-existent. The 
implications for public policy from this approach are, however, much less clear and 
perhaps more piecemeal. 
We also discuss analyses of systematic failure, not so much on the part of markets or 
politicians, but by voters. Most clearly this could lead to populism and relaxing the 
idea that voters necessarily choose their interests. The implications for public policy 
are addressed. Throughout the paper we will relate the discussion to the experience of 
UK government policy-making.  
 
The approaches and opinions of economists often dominate public policy discussion. 
Economists have gained this privileged position partly (or perhaps mainly) because of 
the obvious relevance of their subject matter, but also because of the unified 
methodology (neo-classical economics) that the vast majority of modern economists 
bring to their analysis of policy problems and proposed solutions. The idea of Pareto 
efficiency and its potential trade-off with equity is a central idea that is understood by 
all economists and this common language provides the economics profession with a 
                                                 
1 This paper is published in the March, 2008 edition of New Political Economy 
powerful voice in public affairs.1 The purpose of this paper is to review and reflect 
upon the way in which economists find themselves analysing and providing 
suggestions for social improvements and how this role has changed over roughly the 
last 60 years. 
 
We focus on the fundamental split in the public economics tradition between those 
that adhere to public finance and those that adhere to public choice. A pure public 
finance perspective views failures in society as failures of the market. The solutions 
are technical, as might be enacted by a benevolent dictator. The pure public choice 
view accepts (sometimes grudgingly) that markets may fail, but so, it insists, does 
politics. This signals institutional reforms to constrain the potential for political 
failure. Certain policy recommendations may be viewed as compatible with both 
traditions, but other policy proposals will be the opposite of that proposed within the 
other tradition. 
 
In recent years a political economics synthesis emerged. This accepts that institutions 
are very important and governments require constraints, but that some degree of 
benevolence on the part of policy makers should not be assumed non-existent. The 
implications for public policy from this approach are, however, much less clear and 
perhaps more piecemeal. 
 
We also discuss analyses of systematic failure, not so much on the part of markets or 
politicians, but by voters. Most clearly this could lead to populism and relaxing the 
idea that voters necessarily choose their interests. The implications for public policy 
are addressed. Throughout the paper we will relate the discussion to the experience of 
UK government policy-making.  
 
Public finance and public choice 
The public finance approach and normative analysis 
The normative basis conventionally used in Economics is Pareto efficiency which is, 
in turn, embedded within the maximisation of a social welfare function. Pareto 
efficiency in its narrowest form states that those changes, and only those changes, 
which make at least one person better off while making nobody worse off should be 
made. This would seem to be highly restrictive. However, the possibility of 
compensating losers from the gains accruing to the winners greatly expands the set of 
possible policy initiatives to include all those that maximise social surplus. At the core 
of this approach lie the two theorems of welfare economics: 
• Every competitive economy is Pareto efficient 
• Every Pareto efficient resource allocation can be attained through a 
competitive market mechanism, with the appropriate initial redistributions2  
 
At one level the first theorem is often considered a statement of the genius of free 
market institutions as originally posited by Adam Smith. The second theorem could 
be viewed as a device that binds economists together regardless of their political 
views. Whatever the societal preference for distributive justice, society can have what 
it wants (determined by the specification of a social welfare function) at no cost in 
terms of efficiency. Indeed, the economist may argue that such an ethical choice 
requires the expertise of the moral philosopher and the economist can concentrate on 
the first theorem – that is achieving efficient outcomes. In theory, issues of efficiency 
and distribution can be separated.  
 
Public finance emerges from the recognition that the conditions required for the two 
theorems to hold are not possible. Market failures are widespread caused by non-
excludability, non-rivalry, imperfect competition and problems of information (both 
lack of information and its asymmetry). In addition, lump-sum taxes are infeasible. As 
such, redistribution requires distortionary taxation so that efficiency and distribution 
can no longer be completely separated. The failure of the two theorems creates much 
work for the policy expert. Policies to improve efficiency must be devised and 
redistribution must now take account of efficiency losses.3 This approach is 
classically seen in the work of Pigou, where it was famously challenged by Coase. It 
also thrives in the fiscal federalism literature; see for example Oates.4 Pure public 
finance proceeds in an institutional vacuum. The government is a benevolent dictator 
and will implement best policy. Citizens are depicted as passive and this follows 
naturally from the assumption of a benevolent dictator. The dictator will not be 
influenced by interest groups or the opportunity of personal gain, so citizens 
presumably see no case for becoming politically active. The policy expert is 
triumphant as they inform the benevolent dictator of the best means to provide for 
efficiency, redistribution and macroeconomic stability (the traditional tri-partite roles 
for public finance as defined by Musgrave).5 We will not attempt to discuss the 
multitude of areas in which advice is proffered, but will make reference to specific 
examples later in the paper. It is suffice to say that the twin goals of achieving 
allocative efficiency with due regard for equality provides the template to which 
virtually all academic economic advice refers. 
 
Designing policies to achieve these objectives is in itself an exceptionally complex 
task, for example consider the difficulties involved in designing preference revelation 
mechanisms for provision of public goods or the problems posed by the theory of 
second-best.6 For this reason the public finance economist may, with some 
justification, argue that this provides a challenging enough problem without having to 
worry about political institutions. Furthermore, is it not a sensible division of labour 
that economists concern themselves with efficiency and leave the concern regarding 
institutions to the political scientist? Indeed it could be argued that by fulfilling their 
role, public finance economists have greatly assisted the political scientist by 
providing a picture of an optimal world which institutions should aim to provide, but 
direct engagement in institutional design is not their concern.  This is certainly not a 
view that would be shared by adherents of the public choice approach. 
 
The public choice approach and normative analysis 
Clearly the public finance approach is not realistic. It is free of institutions and is 
really an exercise in social engineering where the task is the technical one of devising 
policies to achieve maximum social surplus. There will be differences of opinion over 
the distribution of income, but assuming this is the only dimension of political 
disagreement and preferences are single-peaked the view of the median voter will 
win. But how this uniquely selected level of redistribution is achieved is once again a 
job for the expert in devising optimal tax regimes. The idea here is that redistribution 
will occur until the marginal social benefit of increased equality equals the marginal 
social cost of increased distortionary taxation.  
 
James Buchanan’s early work on positive public choice launched attacks on two 
fronts. One strand attacked the focus on social choice emerging after the publication 
of Arrow.7 The debate surrounding Arrow’s theorem that a rational social ordering 
will always violate at least one desirable property seemed beside the point to 
Buchanan. For him, the idea of an organic society democratically ranking social 
outcomes was misguided. Social choice rests on a category mistake. Societies do not 
choose, people do. 
 
The second strand of Buchanan’s attack concerned the idea of motivational non-
neutrality as practised in public finance – where participants in the market are 
modelled as self-interested, but the dictator is wholly altruistic.8 Public choice argues 
that the various political actors (politicians, voters, interest groups and bureaucrats) 
should also be modelled as self-interested and the consequences of such an 
assumption explored in greater depth. This provides the subject matter for the positive 
strand of public choice. The idea of an unconstrained, revenue-maximising Leviathan 
is provided by Brennan and Buchanan.9 Brennan and Buchanan set up an 
environment which they admit is unrealistic, but crucially, is at least as realistic as the 
environment inhabited by public finance. In this world, even democracies can 
basically be viewed as dictatorships as elections may do little to hold government to 
account. Here government is modelled as a self-interested Leviathan (motivated as 
self-interested just as economists generally model individuals in a market setting) and 
thus the model of monopolistic behaviour serves as a useful benchmark for how we 
should expect Leviathan to behave. Just as a monopolist will seek to maximise profits, 
Leviathan will seek to maximise tax revenues for personal gain and just like a 
monopolist the Leviathan would prefer to price discriminate in terms of tax rates if 
possible.   
 
The value of institutional constraints upon such a Leviathan has provided the 
normative core of Public Choice just as Paretianism and social welfare has provided 
the normative core of public finance. As with Rawls’ veil of ignorance, Buchanan and 
Tullock analyse how citizens might choose a set of institutions under a veil of 
uncertainty regarding their future positions in such a society.10 In such a 
constitutional setting citizens will realise that sometimes they will win politically and 
sometimes lose and thus will design institutions to sufficiently constrain government 
and prevent extreme outcomes. The constitution will design electoral rules, post-
electoral institutions, the degree of decentralization and stipulate constitutional rights 
(to protect minorities from the potential electoral ‘tyranny of the majority’) backed by 
an independent judiciary. The spirit and intent of the US Constitution and its various 
checks and balances is often held as an ideal set of institutions. The policies that 
emerge from the political process may not be so different from those that would be 
proposed by public finance economists as before, but now the scope of government 
activity has been restricted. To this extent the difference between public finance and 
public choice is not so much on policy content but on just how much policy there 
should be.  However, it is also possible (indeed more likely) that the policies that do 
emerge would be very different from those proposed by public finance economists 
and it is in this that a further striking difference in the two approaches exists. Public 
choice in its purest form may view policy advice as largely pointless. Policy will 
emerge as the equilibrium of ‘in-period’ political play between the various political 
actors in a society and this may be unresponsive to ‘good’ advice. The best/only thing 
that can be done is to influence policy via a common agreement at a constitutional 
stage to introduce institutional reform which implements procedural rules and 
substantive constraints.  
 
Many public choice scholars would not take as extreme a line and would argue that 
policy proposals may have significant influence on the policy process. However, it 
may also be the case that policy proposals differ in the two schools of thought due to 
different views on human nature. One area may be the extent of using market forces 
for the provision of government services. For instance, if public finance economists 
extend public motivation beyond the dictator to public sector workers in general, then 
public finance economists may argue against the use of market forces in public 
provision on efficiency grounds. Another difference may emerge from the 
constitutional perspective itself. In addition to the sorts of constitutional proposals 
mentioned above, Brennan and Buchanan also make a radical proposal for a fiscal 
constitution. These fiscal constraints may be complementary or a substitute for non-
fiscal constraints depending on specific circumstances. Of greatest relevance for this 
paper on policy advice, the fiscal constitution proposed by Brennan and Buchanan 
would actually recommend specific rules for tax rates. Therefore, they simultaneously 
provide policy recommendation as part of their constitutional recommendations. Or 
put differently, they take an area, taxation, conventionally viewed as a policy 
instrument under the control of government and implicitly open to in-period policy 
advice and instead fix it as part of a set of constitutional rules, thus not leaving it open 
to policy advice.  Further, these recommendations with regard to taxation may be the 
opposite of those proposed in the optimal taxation literature. Allowing Leviathan to 
use taxes causing least distortion is equivalent to helping a monopolist to price 
discriminate. They have access to taxes that are too good at raising income. As such, 
uniform taxation or even rules such that taxation should be focussed on goods with 
the most elastic demand would greatly restrict Leviathan’s tax-raising power. The 
more distortionary the tax base the better it is for tying the grabbing hand.  
 
Clearly if elections are more powerful and/or non-fiscal rules are substitutes for fiscal 
rules then Brennan and Buchanan’s controversial approach to taxation could be 
relaxed. Nonetheless, such a view could not have emerged from the public finance 
perspective but follows naturally once self-interest on the part of politicians is 
assumed. Constitutions are important, as Hume had argued, to protect us from 
knaves.11 So the shift in the normative public choice perspective is from in-period 
policy advice to higher level advice on the rules of the political game and sometimes 
these rules will simultaneously embody policy content. Policy advice may be ignored 
by politicians as it may conflict with the self-interest of government. However, if 
institutions are well designed the agent (the government) will take actions that serve 
the principal (the electorate) if it leads to being re-elected and being re-elected is 
attractive for the politician. So policy advice is not irrelevant, but the adoption of such 
advice is dependent in turn on a ‘good’ set of institutions.  
 
The public choice approach opened up a role for economists as advisors not just on 
policy initiatives, but also on the reform of the institutions within which such policy 
takes place. Public choice scholars have traditionally been very clear in the 
constitutional recommendations they make. In addition to the possibility of fiscal 
rules, we can also add inclusive voting rules (Buchanan & Tullock), decentralisation 
to promote yardstick competition (Brennan & Buchanan), constitutionally binding 
redistribution and macroeconomic stability and thus let in-period politics deal only 
with allocative efficiency (Mueller).12 We will argue in the next section that modern 
political economics is more reluctant to make bold recommendations. However, we 
will also argue that this is now also true of the work by scholars identified more 
closely with the public choice tradition. 
 The political economics approach and normative analysis 
In the introductory chapter of their influential book, Persson & Tabellini argue for 
combining the best of three traditions: the theory of macroeconomic policy, public 
choice and formal political analysis.13 Their deviation from public choice is 
methodological; they write ‘Researchers in this tradition were reluctant, however, to 
use formal game-theoretic tools or to impose strong notions of individual rationality. 
As a result, the initial work sometimes relied on weaker theoretical or 
microeconomics foundations.’ 
 
This is also the substance of the argument by Alesina, Persson and Tabellini in their 
debate with Blankart & Koester.14 Alesina et al argue that Blankart & Koester’s 
attempt to make a clear differentiation of the two approaches is misguided and rather 
they regard political economics as evolving out of public choice (along with the 
theory of macroeconomic policy and formal political analysis). We largely agree with 
Alesina, Persson & Tabellini. However, we also believe that there is one area in 
which political economics does represent a fundamental shift from public choice. This 
comes through the willingness to include public motivation in political economics 
models. But, we also argue that a willingness to accept public motivation has also 
been a feature in the more recent work of scholars closely associated with public 
choice. In the third subsection, we also address the increasing attention being given to 
voter rationality. 
 
Positive political economics and normative analysis 
A key problem with the public choice emphasis on constitutional reform is how 
would a constitutional convention be created? Solving the institutional principal-agent 
problem, with regards to political rules and the internal incentive structure of public 
bodies is the major task, but advice on institutions will not be sought if current 
arrangements are satisfactory for the government or powerful interest groups.  
So why, for instance, would a dictatorship ever initiate a convention on constitutional 
reform which would ultimately reduce its power? Such a move from dictatorship to 
well-designed democratic institutions should lead to an improvement in both 
efficiency and equity. Where a self-interested dictator rules over a passive citizenry, 
the tax rate is set at a level that maximises revenue to the dictator but not social 
surplus and transfers are made not to achieve some ethical objective, but rather to 
enrich the dictator.15 Clearly a movement towards greater efficiency (lower taxes) is 
not in the interests of the dictator as it reduces revenue. The situation can only change 
if citizens are active rather than passive. Active citizens can force change through the 
threat of revolt and change may either arise by rewarding citizens with a larger slice 
of the pie or institutional reform (for example extension of the franchise).  
 
This process of institutional change takes us a long way from the idealised 
environment of a constitutional convention of experts selecting a socially optimal set 
of institutions. Instead, democracy develops as a sequence of compromises between 
the ruler and the ruled and these institutions are likely to result in policies that will 
still greatly trouble academic advisors. In particular, there may be a concern that 
government remains too powerful with too great an opportunity to be corrupt. Policies 
may be geared too much towards satisfying powerful interest groups rather than 
towards the public interest. The existence of compromise institutions leaves 
substantial room for policy and institutional advice. Whether a self-interested 
government would wish to listen to such advice is questionable, unless it would lead 
to clear electoral advantages which would compensate for lost revenue (either through 
reduced corruption or support from interest groups). This, in turn, depends on the 
existence of powerful political competition. 
So institutions do not tend to have been created in some ideal setting, but rather they 
have evolved. These institutions may be efficient or inefficient, where we define 
efficiency in the standard Paretian sense. More precisely, we can split institutional 
inefficiency in to two types: the productive inefficiency of government institutions 
(which would include corruption) and where redistribution occurs it may occur 
inefficiently in that it happens at a higher cost than would seem to be necessary.  
 
Inefficient institutions create a paradox at the heart of public choice analysis. If there 
are policies or institutional arrangements that would increase social surplus, then why 
would the government not wish to implement them and become better off in the 
process? This is essentially a rephrasing of the Coase Theorem – if there are gains in 
social surplus why do the relevant agents not find a way of dividing up the gains to 
leave all parties better off?16 The problem is that such moves would not be rational 
for the government if it led to a change in political equilibrium that resulted in their 
loss of power or income. So inefficient policies and institutional arrangements may 
continue because no clear way of separating efficiency and distribution can be found. 
It is not possible to compensate the losers of political change, because the winners 
will have no ex post incentive to do so – there is a time-inconsistency problem.  
 
So, for example, efficient policies that would enrich a certain group of citizens could, 
in theory, be implemented with a promise that they would compensate the political 
leaders out of their increased wealth at a later stage. However, the political leaders 
will anticipate that the group instead of compensating them ex post, will use their 
increased wealth to try and take power themselves or extract further favourable 
policies. For example, increasing public sector efficiency today could be made 
worthwhile with the promise of ex post rewards but future taxpayers may not agree. 
Anticipation of this may destroy the incentive to increase efficiency today.  
 
Similarly, Acemoglu and Robinson argue that in areas such as trade policy, 
agricultural support and labour markets transfers continue to be made inefficiently 
because the beneficiaries of these understand that efficient transfers in the form of 
cash transfers may reduce the future numbers in the interest group and thus lead to the 
cancellation of all transfers by future taxpayers.17  
 
Perhaps the most famous example of time-inconsistency is in macroeconomics as 
analysed by Kydland and Prescott.18 The government announces a low inflation 
target, but for electoral reasons expands the money supply at a later date. But since 
agents in the economy rationally know that the government, which faces an election 
every four or five years,  cannot credibly commit to low inflation, they will not 
believe the inflation target in the first place and by expecting higher inflation will 
demand higher wages and the policy is ineffective. The solution to this problem is to 
remove control of the money supply from the government, but then why would any 
self-interested politician agree to rules over discretion? We will return to this issue 
later. 
 
The problem of commitment is a severe problem in a democracy. Any academic 
policy advisor is required to think not just about social welfare, but whether the policy 
advice is time-consistent. It could be argued that theorising about ideal constitutional 
rules, without identifying a solution to time-inconsistency and/or identifying how 
such a constitutional convention could come about is interesting but ultimately 
irrelevant. 
 
If the focus on commitment and the naivety of theorizing about ideally created 
constitutions is an implicit attack on traditional public choice, a more explicit attack is 
provided by Besley & Coate.19 Buchanan had argued that the public finance/welfare 
case for public intervention clearly fails to take account of the political process. In 
public finance theory, the introduction of a policy instrument (such as a tax or 
subsidy) would lead to socially optimal provision of, for example, externality 
producing goods. In reality, interest groups compete so that the level of actual 
provision may be socially inferior to that which would have existed in the free market. 
The pure public finance approach recommends too much intervention as it does not 
consider political market failures emerging from the political process.20  
 
Besley & Coate take this point, but instead argue that there is an additional 
implication neglected by the public choice critique. The public choice critique ignores 
the spillover effects of introducing new policy instruments. So for example, 
socialising health care provision may lead elderly voters who normally vote for right 
parties to support left parties. This alters political coalitions and in turn has effects 
upon a host of other policy dimensions. All of these effects would need to be 
considered, many of which could have a positive effect upon social welfare. Indeed, 
they provide a model where the first best provision of a public good is zero, but due to 
its positive effect upon redistributive taxation it would be worth providing, they write 
that “the conservative bias of the public choice critique suggested by earlier work 
need not apply”. (p.255).  
 
However, in the process of weakening the public choice critique we are left with a 
much less clear view of normative intervention than was the case with either the 
public finance or public choice approaches. So a trade-off occurs between getting 
things right and the ability to make normative recommendations. 
 
A crude description of the difference between public finance and public choice is that 
the former finds big government more acceptable. The former focussed on the failure 
of markets and the latter focussed on the danger of putting too much faith in 
government to solve these failures. Political economics as a synthesis would seem to 
be more at home with both points of view and to that extent is harder to attach a 
particular political preference to. More focus is given to positive analysis and 
empirical work on the effects of institutions with much less emphasis on prescriptive 
analysis. Often in the public choice literature institutional innovations that would 
reduce the size of the state would be explicitly or implicitly recommended. Modern 
political economics tends to stress trade-offs without stating explicit preferences. So 
for example Persson and Tabellini’s focus on the trade-off between the leanness of 
majority rule but at the expense of more narrowly focussed policies versus the 
bloatedness of PR but with the benefit of more generally focussed policies.21  
 
All the examples provided here are either ambiguous with regard to what is ‘best’ or 
take a very sceptical view as to the possibility of achieving ‘best’. However, as 
mentioned above this work could simply be viewed as an evolution of public choice 
where much closer attention is paid to modelling and statistical techniques. The 
application of these techniques creates scepticism with regard to the confidence of 
normative public choice. Nonetheless, the underlying assumptions of agent 
motivation are not different in the work we have discussed so far. A large volume of 
work in political economics is happy to relax the self-interest assumption. 
 
Restoring public motivation and normative analysis 
Social progress in the public choice approach will not emerge from the altruism of 
politicians, but rather the creation of good institutions which align the self interest of 
political agents with the electorate. Constitutional moments may occur which allow 
for institutional innovation on the part of the advisor. The public choice approach 
emerged as the antithesis of the public finance approach and we now argue that a 
dialectic has led to a synthesis of the two approaches emerging in recent years. In this 
synthesis institutions are certainly viewed as important, but not all politicians are bad. 
We label this approach the political economics synthesis. 
 
What has caused this synthesis? Modern economics has become more open minded 
with regard to the contents of a utility function. Human beings are seemingly much 
less self-interested  than homo economicus can account for and as a result economists 
are less inclined to assume pure self-interest in their models.22
 
This general development in economics has been reflected more specifically within 
the political economics literature. An ambivalence regarding the motives of 
politicians is reflected in the literature on political agency.23 This work applies 
models of asymmetric information where political types (either ‘good’ or ‘bad’) exist 
and the task for the voter is to identify which of these the incumbent government is 
and vote accordingly. The problem is that the bad politician will sometimes have the 
incentive to mimic the action of a good politician. This in turn creates two conflicting 
benefits of elections. On the one hand, if a bad politician behaves well to get re-
elected this is a positive discipline effect. On the other hand, if they do so there is a 
higher probability that the government will be of lower quality after this election, this 
is called the selection effect.  
 
The optimum lies between allowing too much freedom for politicians who may turn 
out to be corrupt and binding the hands of government that may have been 
benevolent. As an example, forcing inefficient taxation constitutionally as a means of 
reducing tax-raising power would not be a sensible idea if politicians are likely to be 
bad. Therefore, political economics, unlike the other two traditions, does not provide 
clear implications on policy/institutional initiatives. Public finance prescribes optimal 
first order institutions. Normative public choice claims that such institutions are 
unachievable and settles for second-order institutions such as constitutional rules.  
 
Besley and Smart discuss various restraints upon Leviathan and show how 
institutional recommendations are strongly affected by the likelihood of politicians 
turning out to be good or publicly motivated.24 They analyse the case for inefficient 
taxation, limiting the power to tax, increasing fiscal transparency and yardstick 
competition. Allowing for different political types has a major impact on institutional 
design. Crucially, creating rules for inefficient taxation and yardstick competition 
only works if there are a relatively high proportion of good politicians. If this is the 
case, the improved selection effect compensates for the reduced discipline. Bad 
incumbents find it less attractive to mimic good politicians as the potential gains are 
so limited, so they extract surplus today instead and accept losing the election. This 
will be welfare increasing if the bad incumbent is likely to be replaced by a good 
politician. This finding is, of course, ironic as these constitutional devices were 
recommended for an environment in which all politicians were assumed to be bad. 
The implication for normative analysis and constitutional design, in common with the 
previous subsection, is ambiguous.   
This ambiguity is not applicable only to political economics. It has been happening 
within traditional public choice circles as well. An aspect of this can be traced to the 
public choice focus on the ‘paradox of voting’. Since the likelihood of determining 
the outcome of elections is effectively zero there would appear to be very little 
instrumental benefit from voting. So if there is any cost to voting, the benefit that 
drives people to incur this cost must be a direct or expressive benefit. What precisely 
this expressive benefit is lies open to debate, but one possibility is that it may be 
ethical. It is easier to think morally when one does not have to pay the cost of a 
decision and this is the effect that being non-decisive when voting creates.25
A variation on this argument has been made by Brennan and Hamlin (1999) where 
they construct an argument for representative democracy as a first-best arrangement 
for political decision-making rather than a second best one (second best because it 
saves on the transaction costs of direct democracy). Their argument is that we may 
possess moral dispositions which seek out politicians who are moral when we vote 
expressively. This would lead to a morally superior parliament than one that would 
have been selected randomly. Beyond this argument though, the scope for normative 
recommendation in the book by Brennan and Hamlin is greatly reduced compared to 
that contained in Brennan and Buchanan.26  
 
Le Grand distinguishes politicians as being knights or knaves, and citizens as being 
pawns (passive) or queens (agents). With this framework he argues that post-1945 
government policy proceeded as if it were an interaction of knights and pawns. This, 
of course, is also the public finance approach. Le Grand identifies the Thatcher years 
in the UK as signalling a switch to the idea of knaves interacting with queens. Thus, 
we see moves towards privatisation, reduced taxation and eventually the introduction 
of market forces in the provision of public services. This was clearly influenced by 
public choice reasoning.27  
 
Since the change of UK government in 1997, there seems to be a greater tension as to 
whether politicians should be viewed as exhibiting knight or knave characteristics and 
whether voters should be viewed as pawns or agents. For example, The Bank of 
England was made independent and this could be interpreted as a view of politicians 
as essentially knavish in that they could not be trusted with monetary policy. 
However, surely it would take a knight to implement such an institutional change and 
have the courage to bind their own hands? An alternative interpretation is also 
available. This could simply have been the action of a knavish politician who wants to 
be re-elected. The Labour party realising that they lose elections due to  a lack of trust 
in their economic competence take this measure and adopt other rules (such as the 
Golden Rule that over the economic cycle governments should borrow only to invest 
and not to fund current spending) to establish a good reputation. Whether Gordon 
Brown was a knight or a knave, the interests of vote-seeking politicians had become 
aligned with an institutional innovation that was in the voters’ interests. 
 
The Labour government has continued (although with considerable internal party 
dissent) with the use of market forces in the provision of public services. To that 
extent, the public choice perspective is winning through. But running contrary to this 
point is the increased size of the state under the Labour government and this trust in 
the ability of government to intervene and solve for market failures is much more in 
line with a public finance view. The presence of both a trust in the role of 
government, but an awareness of the importance of incentives is characteristic of the 
more complicated motivational landscape as discussed above.  
 
Uninformed voting, populism and normative analysis 
Much of what has been said is based on the assumption that if citizens do get to make 
choices that they are well-informed. This assumption has been given considerable 
attention recently. This goes back to the problem of ‘rational ignorance’ as recognised 
by Downs.28 Citizens may not understand the policies being proposed, have no 
economic incentive to become informed (due to the probability of determining the 
outcome of elections being effectively zero) and thus choose irrationally. Non-
benevolent politicians may feel no great incentive to attempt to correct for this 
ignorance and provide the policies that the people want regardless of their implication 
for social welfare. 
  
The possibility that the electorate will not choose policies that are in their own 
interests is very damaging for academic policy advice as good policy is no longer 
necessarily a vote-winner. The ‘Chicago’ school would argue that this argument is 
overly pessimistic.29  They would argue that rational ignorance would imply random 
selection rather than consistently irrational choice and furthermore rational people 
learn from mistakes and will not continue to support ‘bad’ policy.  Furthermore, 
democratic political competition and a free press will provide information on policy 
choices and the behaviour of incumbent politicians thus limiting their ability to be 
corrupt. So, voters may not be completely ignorant and combined with vibrant 
political competition this may ensure that voters are more likely to vote their interests 
than not and if this is the case good policy advice will be a vote winner.  
Voters are rarely confronted with a political choice in which they determine the 
outcome. So voters may vote against policy initiatives on highly questionable equity 
grounds without due consideration of efficiency gains, for example tuition fees for 
higher education and the use of market forces in the provision of public services. 
Voters may expressively attach themselves against tuition fees or market forces on 
strictly equity grounds. However, this can blind them to arguments that these stances 
are either not equitable (particularly relevant to opposing tuition fees) or that the voter 
should weigh up the potential efficiency gains versus equity implications. These 
considerations may not enter the voting calculus for the very nature of electoral 
decision-making is to render voters non-decisive with regard to the outcome; this in 
turn creates a disincentive to become properly informed about the issues. Voters may 
also weigh too heavily nationalistic concerns that may lead them to favour 
protectionist policies that are not in their instrumental interests. Voters may choose 
more myopically than they would choose instrumentally and this has created 
difficulties for green taxation for example. In September 2000, direct action by 
farmers and hauliers in protest against fuel taxes led the UK government to abandon 
the main form of environmental taxation to that date – namely the fuel duty escalator. 
Public opinion sided with the protesters.30 Not until the Pre-Budget Report 2006 did 
the UK government gingerly return to the subject of raising environmental taxes, 
beginning with air passenger duty, which polling had shown to be popular.31
 
Combining this idea with the possibility that politicians may be benevolent or vote 
maximisers sets up a contrast between actions that would be taken by statesmen 
versus actions that would be taken by populists. Agency models are relevant here, 
except that now it would be the good politician who finds that they need to mimic a 
populist in order to be re-elected.  However, it is also good politicians who have the 
incentive to work harder to inform the public regarding the quality of their policy 
proposals. 32
 
In such a model of politics economic advisors may find themselves in direct conflict 
with political advisors. The battle between the statesman and the populist is hardly 
new but is likely to be more intense at times when left and right have largely 
converged thus creating a more vigorous competition for votes. A central conflict in 
politics is then between those politicians who wish to listen more to the economic 
advisor (and risk losing elections) and those that listen more to their political advisor 
(and risk implementing poor economic policies). The example of UK environmental 
taxes is again relevant. Chancellor Brown may be fairly accused of having listened to 
political advisers in 2000 over fuel tax. It is characteristic of his way of working that, 
when he wishes to prepare public opinion, or give a boost to a trend which is already 
going in a direction he supports, he commissions an independent or ‘independent’ 
review of a policy area by some weighty figure. Such a review was the Stern Review 
of the economics of climate change, published in November 2005.33 Sir Nicholas 
Stern was, at the time of the report, the Head of the UK Government Economic 
Service. But he was not a conventional government economist. Chancellor Brown 
recruited him from his previous position as chief economist at the World Bank, and 
since his report he has returned to academe. 
 
The Stern Report is weighty political economics. It identifies global warming as a 
global public bad. But then (as Stern and Brown are well aware) there is a global n-
player prisoners’ dilemma among the governments and peoples of the world. If a 
government can free-ride on others’ efforts to curb global warming, it will, as in the 
short term defection strictly dominates cooperation. However, in the UK the 
opposition Liberal Democratic, Conservative, and (of course) Green parties have 
already committed themselves to supporting collective action against global warming. 
Conservative leader David Cameron took a much mocked trip (by air) to northern 
Norway to see the glaciers there receding.34  This was part of his repositioning the 
party, by cheap talk gestures, away from (what was perceived as) the hard right 
positions associated with Margaret Thatcher and closer to the median voter. By the 
time the Stern Report was published, therefore, Brown had ample cover to do what he 
believed to be economically right. 
 
The prescriptive implications of this neglected political dilemma are not clear. If 
politicians are responsive to voting then it is acting as a constraint on government 
activity and so may be effective in rooting out corruption. But it may result in policies 
that are ultimately not in the interests of the voter. This would point towards a greater 
role for paternalism at the expense of allowing decisions to be made through 
elections. If this is considered too risky then it could be that populism is the price that 
has to be paid to avoid further constitutional constraints on government action. 
Nonetheless, policy or institutional initiatives that improve the information available 
to voters would clearly be efficient. Further, it calls into question the wisdom of calls 
for compulsory voting. Perhaps a relatively small, but well-informed turnout is better 
if there is a tendency towards populism on the part of politicians. However, this would 
have to be weighed against the potential informational role that electoral participation 
in itself creates. 
 
Concluding Comments 
The paper has traced a dialectic within Public Economics. The optimistic view of 
government intervention devised in the public finance tradition was met with the 
pessimistic view contained within the public choice approach. Public choice has both 
been challenged and has itself evolved in more recent times such that a new synthetic 
paradigm has emerged in the form of Political Economics. It challenges public choice 
in its more technical methodology,  its increased focus on positive, rather than 
normative, analysis of institutions and in its willingness to allow for the existence of 
publicly motivated politicians. A trade-off involved in these developments is that the 
scope for making proposals for policy and institutional reforms appears to be 
considerably less clear than was the case in the public finance and public choice 
traditions. Finally, we identify a further area of focus that has been receiving 
increasing attention in recent times. This is the idea that, in addition, to the possibility 
of markets and politicians failing, voters might also fail to vote their interests and thus 
provide for another source of failure. This serves to further deepen the difficulty of 
making clear normative prescriptions in political economics. 
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